Heterogeneity and the Baloch Identity.

Heterogeneity and the Baloch Identity

Reposted from Balochi Linguist | September 20, 2011 | Heterogeneity and the Baloch Identity
Also see: Zrombesh | July 4, 2012 | A glimpse at Baloch Nationalism
Also see 2009 interview with Dr. Breseeg by Karlos Zurutuza: Interview

By Professor Dr. Taj Mohammad Breseeg
As the saying goes, “nations are built when diversity is accepted, just as communities are built when individuals can be themselves and yet work for and with each other.” In order to understand the pluralistic structure of the Baloch society, this paper begins with a critical study of the Baloch’s sense of identity, by discarding idealist views of national identity that overemphasize similarities.
Introduction
As the saying goes, “nations are built when diversity is accepted, just as communities are built when individuals can be themselves and yet work for and with each other.” In order to understand the pluralistic structure of the Baloch society, this paper begins with a critical study of the Baloch’s sense of identity, by discarding idealist views of national identity that overemphasize similarities. From this perspective, identity refers to the sharing of essential elements that define the character and orientation of people and affirm their common needs, interests, and goals with reference to joint action. At the same time it recognizes the importance of differences. Simply put, a nuanced view of national identity does not exclude heterogeneity and plurality. This is not an idealized view, but one rooted in sociological inquiry, in which heterogeneity and shared identity together help form potential building blocks of a positive future for the Baloch.
Yet the dilemma of reconciling plurality and unity constitutes an integral part of the definition of the Baloch identity. In fact, one flaw in the thinking by the Baloch about themselves is the tendency toward an idealized concept of identity as something that is already completely formed, rather than as something to be achieved. Hence, there is a lack of thinking about the conditions that contribute to the making and unmaking of the Baloch national identity. The belief that unity is inevitable, a foregone conclusion, flows from this idealized view of it.
Another equally serious flaw is the tendency among some of the Baloch nationalists to think in terms of separate and independent forces of unity and forces of divisiveness, ignoring the dialectical relationship between these forces. Thus, we have been told repeatedly that there are certain elements of unity (such as language, common culture, geography, or shared history) as well as certain elements of fragmentation (such as communalism, tribalism, localism, or regionalism). If, instead, we view these forces from the vantage point of dialectical relations, the definition of Baloch identity involves a simultaneous and systematic examination of both the processes of unification and fragmentation. This very point makes it possible to argue that the Baloch can belong together without being the same; similarly, it can be seen that they may have antagonistic relations without being different.
The Sense of Belonging
The specificity of Balochistan geography and geopolitics has affected and shaped the character of the Baloch, their vision of the world and the way they have continued to reproduce and reinterpret their cultural elements and traditions. The Baloch myths and memories persist over generations and centuries, forming contents and contexts for collective self-definition and affirmation of collective identities in the face of the other.[1]
Located on the south-eastern Iranian plateau, with an approximately 600,000 sq. km., an area rich with diversity, that also incorporates within it a wide social variety, Balochistan is larger than France (551,500 sq. km.).[2] It is an austere land of steppe and desert intersected by numerous mountain chains. Naturally, the climate of such a vast territory has extraordinary varieties.[3] In the northern and interior highlands, the temperature often drops to 400 F in winter, while the summers are temperate. The coastal region is extremely hot, with temperature soaring between 1000 to 1300 F in summers, while winters provide a more favourable climate. In spite of its position on the direction of southwest monsoon winds from Indian Ocean, Balochistan seldom receives more than 5 to 12 inches of rainfall per year due to the low altitude of Makkoran’s coastal ranges.[4] The ecological factors have, however, been responsible for the fragmentation of agricultural centres and pasturelands, thus shaping the formation of the traditional tribal economy and its corresponding socio-political institutions.[5]
Balochistan’s geographical location between India and the Mesopotamian civilization had given it a unique position as cross roads between earlier civilizations. Some of the earliest human civilizations emerged in Balochistan, Mehrgar the earliest civilization known to man kind yet, is located in eastern Balochistan, the Kech civilization in central Makkuran date back to 4000 BC, Burned city near Zahidan, the provincial capital in western Balochistan date back to 3000 BC. Thus, by the course of time, a cluster of different religions, languages and cultures coexisted side by side. Similarly in the Islamic era we see the flourishing of different sects of Islam (Sunni, Zikri and Shia), remarkable marriage of tribal and semi-tribal society enriched with colourful cultural and traditional heritage.[6]
The Baloch, probably numbering close to 15 million, are one of the largest trans-state nations in southwest Asia.[7] The question of Baloch origins, i.e., who the Baloch are and where they come from, has for too long remained an enigma. Doubtless in a few words one can respond, for example, that Baloch are the end-product of numerous layers of cultural and genetic material superimposed over thousands of years of internal migrations, immigrations, cultural innovations and importations.Balochistan, the cradle of ancient civilizations, has seen many races, people, religions and cultures during the past few thousand years. From the beginning of classical history three old-world civilizations, Dravidian, Semitic and Aryan, met, formed bonds, and were mutually influenced on the soil of Balochistan. To a lesser or greater extent, they left their marks on this soil, particularly in the religious beliefs and the ethnic composition of the country.[8]
The exact meaning and origin of the term Baloch is somewhat cloudy. Its designation may have a geographical origin, as is the case of many nations in the world. Etymological view supported by some scholars is that the name Baloch probably derives from Gedrozia or “Kedrozia” the name of the Baloch country in the time of Alexander the Great (356-323 BC)”.[9] The term Gedrozia with the suffix of “ia” seems to be a Greek or Latin construction, like Pers-ia , Ind -ia, Kurdia, etc. Gedrozia, the land of the rising sun, was the eastern most Satrapy (province) of the Median Empire. Probably, its location was the main source of its designation as “Gedroz or Gedrozia”. It should be noted that there are two other eastern countries in the Iranian plateau, namely Khoran and Nimroz, both have their designation originated from the same source, the sun. They are known as the lands of rising sun. Like the suffix “istan”, Roz (Roch) is also a suffix for various place and family names construction in Iranian languages.
Having studied the etymology of the term “Kurd”, the Kurdish scholar Mohammad Amin Seraji believes that the term “Baloch” is the corrupted form of the term Baroch or Baroz. Arguing on the origin and the meaning of the term, Seraji says, the Baroz has a common meaning both in Kurdish and Balochi, which means the land of the rising sun (ba-roch or “toward sun”). Locating at the eastern most corner of the Median Empire, the county probably got the designation “Baroch or baroz” during the Median or early Achaemenid era, believes Seraji. According to him, there are several tribes living in Eastern Kurdistan, who are called Barozi (because of their eastward location in the region). Based on an ancient Mesopotamian text, some scholars, however, opine that the word “Baloch” is a corrupted form of Melukhkha, Meluccha or Mleccha, which was the designation of the modern eastern Makkoran during the third and the second millennia B.C.[10]
Historically, defeating the Median Empire in 549 BC, the mightiest Persian King, Darius (522-485), subjugated Balochistan at around 540 B.C. He declared the Baloch country as one of his walayat(province) and appointed a satrap (governor) to it.[11] Probably it was during this era, the Madian and the later Persian domination era, the Baloch tribes were gradually Aryanised, and their language and the national characteristics formed. If that is the case, the formation of the Baloch ethno-linguistic identity should be traced back to the early centuries of the first millennium BC.
Etymologically speaking, there are many territorial or regional names, which are derived after the four cardinal points (East, West, North and South).[12] For example, the English word Japan is not the name used for their country by the Japanese while speaking the Japanese language: it is an exonym.[13]The Japanese names for Japan are Nippon and Nihon. Both Nippon and Nihon literally mean “the sun’s origin”, that is, where the sun originates, and are often translated as the Land of the Rising Sun. This nomenclature comes from Imperial correspondence with Chinese Sui Dynasty and refers to Japan’s eastward position relative to China.
Being a Balochi endonym, the origin of the word “Balochistan” can be identified with more precision and certainty. The term constitutes of two parts, “Baloch” and “–stan”. The last part of the name “-stan” is an Indo-Iranian suffix for “place”, prominent in many languages of the region. The name Balochistan quite simply means “the land of the Baloch”, which bears in itself a significant national connotation identifying the country with the Baloch.[14] Gankovsky, a Soviet scholar on the subject, has attributed the appearance of the name to the “formation of Baloch feudal nationality” and the spread of the Baloch over the territory bearing their name to this day during the period between the 12th and the 15th century.[15]
The Baloch may be divided into two major groups. The largest and the most extensive of these are the Baloch who speak Balochi or any of its related dialects. This group represents the Baloch “par excellence”. The second group consists of the various non-Balochi speaking groups, among them are the Baloch of Sindh and Punjab and the Brahuis of eastern Balochistan who speak Sindhi, Seraiki and Brahui respectively. Despite the fact that the latter group differs linguistically, they believe themselves to be Baloch, and this belief is not contested by their Balochi-speaking neighbours. Moreover, many prominent Baloch leaders have come from this second group.[16] Thus, language has never been a hurdle for Balochs’ religious and cultural unity. Even before the improvement of roads, communication, printing, “Doda-o Balach and Shaymorid-o Hani” stories were popular throughout the length and breadth of Balochistan.
Despite the heterogeneous composition of the Baloch, however, in some cases attested in traditions preserved by the tribes, they believe themselves to have a common ancestry. Some scholars have claimed a Semitic ancestry for the Baloch, a claim which is also supported by the Baloch genealogy and traditions, and has found wide acceptance among the Baloch writers. Even though this belief may not necessarily agree with the facts (which, it should be pointed out, are very difficult to prove, either way), it is the concept universally held among members of the group that matters. In this connection Kurdish nationalism offers a good parallel. The fact is that there are many common ethnic factors which have contributed to the formation of the Kurdish nation; there are also factors which have led to divisions within the Kurds themselves. While the languages identified as Kurdish are not the same as the Persian, Arabic, or Turkish, they are mutually unintelligible. Geographically, the division between the Kurmanji-speaking areas and the Sorani-speaking areas correspond with the division between the Sunni and Shiite schools of Islam. Despite all these factors, the Kurds form one of the oldest nations in the Middle East.Tribal loyalties continue to dominate the Baloch society, and the allegiance of the majority of the Baloch have been to their extended families, clans, and tribes. The Baloch tribes share an ideology of common descent and segmentary alliance and opposition. These principles do actually operate at the level of the smaller sub-tribes, but they are contradicted by the political alliances and authority relations integrating these sub-tribes into larger wholes. In a traditional, tribal society a political ideology such as Baloch nationalism would be unable to gain support, because loyalties of tribal members do not extend to entities rather than individual tribes. The failure of the tribes to unite in the cause of Baloch nationalism is a replay of tribal behaviour in both the Pakistani and Iranian Baloch revolts. Within the tribes, an individual’s identity is based on his belonging to a larger group. This larger group is not the nation but the tribe. However, the importance of the rise of a non-tribal movement over more tribal structures should not be underestimated. In this respect the Baloch movements of the 1920s, 1930s, and 1940s provide us a good example.[17]
The Baloch have devised a nationalist ideology, but realise that the tribal support remains a crucial ingredient to any potential success of a national movement. By accepting the support of the tribes, however, the nationalists fall vulnerable to tribal rivalries. Tribal ties, however, are of little significance in southern Balochistan (both Pakistani and Iranian Balochistan), Makkoran, which was originally a stratified society, with a class of nominally Baloch landowners controlling the agricultural resources. The great majority of the tribes in Balochistan view them and are viewed by outsiders as the Baloch.[18]
Politically, the British occupation of the Baloch State of Kalat in 1839 was perhaps the greatest event and turning point in the Baloch history. From the very day the British forces occupied Kalat state, Baloch destiny changed dramatically. The painful consequences for the Baloch were the partition of their land and perpetual occupation by foreign forces. Concerned with con taining the spread of the Russian Socialist Revolution of 1917, the British assisted Persian to incorporate western Balochistan in 1928 in order to strengthen the latter country as a barrier to Russian ex pansion southward. The same concern also led later to the annexation of Eastern Balochistan to Pakistan in 1948.
Thus, colonial interests worked against the Baloch and deprived them of their self-determination and statehood. Confirming this notion, in 2006, in a pamphlet, the Foreign Policy Centre, a leading European think tank, launched under the patronage of the British Prime Minister Tony Blair, revealed that it was British advice that led to the forcible accession of Kalat to Pakistan in 1948. Referring reliable British government archives, the Foreign Policy Centre argues, that the Secretary of State Lord Listowell advised Mountbatten in September 1947 that because of the location of Kalat, it would be too dangerous and risky to allow it to be independent. The British High Commissioner in Pakistan was accordingly asked “to do what he can to guide the Pakistan government away from making any agreement with Kalat which would involve recognition of the state as a separate international entity”.[19]
Since the early 20th century, Balochistan’s political boundaries do not conform to its physical frontier; they vary widely. Eastern Balochistan with Quetta as its capital has been administered by Pakistan since 1948; western Balochistan, officially known as “Sistan-wa-Balochistan” with Zahedan as its capital, has been under the control of Iran since 1928; and the Northern Balochistan known as the Walayat-i-Nimrooz, has been under the Afghan control since the early 20th century.
Shared History
As the Kurd, Baloch make a large ethnic community in the Southwest Asia without a state of their own. Baloch folk tales and legends points out that major shift of Baloch population to the present land of Balochistan were brought about in different times and different places. From linguistic evidence, it appears that the Baloch migrated southward from the region of the Caspian Sea. Viewed against this background, the Baloch changed several geographical, political and social environments. Thus from the very beginning they learned to adjust themselves with different cultures and way of life.
The Baloch history is a chain of unsuccessful uprisings for autonomy and independence. It tells about genocide, forcible assimilation, deportation and life in exile. Since its inception, the Baloch national identity has been seen as based primarily on such experiences. However, the early political history of the Baloch is obscure. It appears to have begun with the process of the decline of the central rule of the Caliphate in the region and the subsequent rise of the Baloch in Makkoran in the early years of the 11th century.[20] The Umawid general Mohammad bin Qasim captured Makkoran in 707 AD. Thereafter, Arab governors ruled the country at least until the late 10th century when the central rule of the Abbasid Caliphate began to decline.[21]
The period of direct Arab rule over Makkoran lasted about three centuries. By gradually accepting Islam, the scattered Baloch tribes over vast area (from Indus in the east, to Kerman in the west), acquired a new common identity, the Islamic. Thus Islam gave them added cohesion.[22] The Arab rule also relieved them from the constant political and military pressure from Persia in the north. Moreover, as mentioned earlier, they benefited materially from the growth of trade and commerce which flourished in the towns and ports under the Arabs, reviving the old sea and land-based trade routes that linked India to Persia and Arabia through western Makkoran.[23]
Under the Arab rule, the Baloch tribal chiefs became a part of the privileged Muslim classes, and identified themselves with the Arab caliphate and represented it in the region. The conflicts between the Arab caliphate and the Baloch on the one hand, and the neighbouring non-Muslim powers on the other, strengthened the “Muslim” identity of the Baloch, while the conflicts between the Arab caliphate and the Baloch contributed to their “tribal unity and common” consciousness. The threats posed to the Arab Empire and to the Baloch, would gradually narrow the gap between the warlike Baloch tribes. In this process, Islam would function as a unifying political ideology and promote a common culture among the Baloch tribal society and its different social classes as a whole. These developments appear to have played a significant role in enabling the Baloch to form large-scale tribal federations that led to their gradual political and military supremacy in the territories now forming Balochistan during the period of 11th to 13th centuries.[24] Thus, the early middle ages saw the first emergence of a distinctive Baloch culture and the establishment of the Baloch principalities and dynasties. As the power of Arabs after the first Islamic staunch victory declined with fragmentation of Islam across the Sunni and Shiites theological lines, the Baloch tribes moved to fill the administrative, political and spiritual vacuum.
Since the 12th century the Baloch formed powerful tribal unions. The confederacy of forty-four tribes under Mir Jalal Khan in the 12th century, the Rind-Lashari confederacy of the fifteenth century, the Maliks, the Dodais, the Boleidais, and the Gichkis of Makkoran, and the Khanate of Balochistan in the 17thcentury, united and merged all the Baloch tribes at different times. Moreover, the invasions of the Mughals and the Tatars, the wars and the mass migrations of the thirteenth and the fourteenth centuries, and the cross tribal alliances and marriages, contributed to the shaping of the Baloch identity.[25]
Thus, historical experiences have played an important role to the formation of the Baloch national identity. In this regards the Swiss experience shows a remarkable similarity. In the Swiss case strength of common historical experience and a common consensus of aspirations have been sufficient to weld into nationhood groups without a common linguistic or cultural background. The history of the Baloch people over the past hundred years has been a history of evolution, from traditional society to a more modern one. (“More modern” is a comparative term, and does not imply a “modern” society, i.e. a culminating end-point to the evolution.) As such, the reliance on tribal criteria is stronger in the earlier movements, and the reliance on nationalism stronger in the later ones. Similarly, the organizing elements in the early movements are the tribes; the political parties gradually replace the tribes as mass mobilization is channeled into political institutions.[26]
Culture and the Baloch Identity
Geography helps, because it accustoms the Baloch to the idea of difference. Thus, the Baloch culture owes much to the geography of the country. The harsh climate and mountainous terrain breeds a self-reliant people used to hardship; the same conditions, however, result in isolation and difficulties in communication. In terms of physical geography, Balochistan has more in common with Iranian plateau than with the Indian subcontinent. On the north, it is separated from India by the massive barrier of the southern buttresses of the Sulaiman Mountains. On the south, there is the long extension from Kalat of the inconceivably wild highland country, which faces the desert of Sindh, the foot of which forms the Indian frontier. The cultural heartland lies in the interior, in the valleys of Kech, Panjgur and Bampur in the Southern and central Balochistan.[27]
Being expressed through language, literature, religion, customs, traditions and beliefs, culture is a complex of many strands of varying importance and vitality. The Balochs’ adjustability, accommodation and spirit of tolerance enable their culture survive several vicissitudes. The Baloch people are distinct from the Punjabi and the Persian elite that dominate Pakistani and Iranian politics – they are Muslims but more secular in their outlook (in a similar fashion to the Kurds) with their own distinct language and culture. Spooner points to the importance of the Balochi language as a unifying factor between the numerous groups nowadays identifying themselves as “Baloch”. He wrote, “Baluch identity in Baluchistan has been closely tied to the use of the Baluchi language in inter-tribal relations”.[28] In spite of almost half a century of brutal assimilation policy, both in Iran and Pakistan, the Baloch people have managed to retain their culture and their oral tradition of story telling. This explains the tendency to dismiss the existing states as artificial and to call for political unity coinciding with linguistic identity. The prevailing view is that only a minority of the people of Balochistan lack a sense of being Baloch; this minority category includes the Persians of Sistan and the Pashtuns of Eastern Balochistan.[29]
It is, however, worth mentioning that the linguistic and ethnic plurality had been the rule in the almost all Baloch tribal unions in the past. The Rind-Lashari union of the 15 century, the Zikri state of Makkuran and the Brahui Confederacy of Kalat, all constituted of diverse tribal confederacies. No attempt had been made to force Kalat subjects to speak Brahui, a large number of tribes did not speak it as their first language and perhaps most Kalat subjects did not speak it at all. The Brahui tribes spoke Barahui, the Lasis and Jadgal spoke Jadgali, and the Baloch spoke Balochi.
Being a tribal people, religion plays a less important role in the daily life of the Baloch. It is generally believed that before the emergence of the Islamic fundamentalism in the region, Baloch were not religiously devout as compared to their neighbours, the Persians, Punjabis and the Pashtuns. Their primary loyalties were to their tribal leaders. Unlike the Afghan he is seldom a religious bigot and, as Sir Denzil Ibbetson, in mid-19th century described the Baloch, “he has less of God in his head, and less of the devil in his nature”[30] Thus, historically speaking, the Baloch always have had a more secular and pluralistic seen on religion than their neighbours.
Because the Pakistani state assumed the mantle of two-nation theory (Islam/Hinduism) based on Islam for its legitimacy, as a countermovement one can expect most Baloch to rely on ethno-nationalism. In 1947, Mir Ghaus Bakhsh Bizenjo voiced the Baluch opinion against the religious nationalism of Pakistan: “We are Muslims but it (this fact) did not mean (it is) necessary to lose our independence and to merge with other (nations) because of the Muslim (faith). If our accession into Pakistan is necessary, being Muslim, then Muslim states of Afghanistan and Iran should also merge with Pakistan.”[31]
As mentioned earlier, linguistically the Baloch society is diverse. There are a substantial number of Brahui speakers in the central and northern Balochistan who are culturally very similar to the Baloch, and the Baloch, who inhabit the Indus Plains, Punjab and Sindh retain their ethnic identity though they now speak Sindhi or Seraiki. Although Brahui and Balochi are unrelated languages, multi-lingualism is common among them. Having considered this reality, Tariq Rahman believes, “The Balochi and Brahvi languages are symbols of the Baloch identity, which is a necessary part of Baloch nationalism.”[32]
Of the various elements that go into the making of the Baloch national identity, probably the most important is a common social and economic structure. For while many racial strains have contributed to the making of the Baloch people, and while there are varying degrees of differences in language and dialect among the various groups, a particular type of social and economic organisation, comprising what has been described as a “tribal culture”, is common to them all. This particular tribal culture is the product of environment, geographical, and historical forces, which have combined to shape the general configuration of Baloch life and institutions. Describing the Baloch economy in early 1980s, a prominent authority on the subject of Baloch nationalism, Selig S. Harrison wrote, “Instead of relying solely on either nomadic pastoralism or on settled agriculture, most Baloch practice a mixture of the two in order to survive”.[33]
A classic sociological principle proposes a positive relationship between external conflicts and internal cohesion.[34] One such exclusive focus is the constantly expressed view that the only thing the Baloch agree on is the hatred of Gajar (Persian) and Punjabi dominance. The common struggle against the alien invaders, while strengthening the common bonds, develops national feelings. According to Peter Kloos, for reasons that are still very unclear, people confronted with powerful forces that lie beyond their horizon, and certainly beyond their control, tend to turn to purportedly primordial categories, turning to the familiarity of their own ethnic background. In the process they try to gain an identity of their own by going back to the fundamentals of their religion, to a language unspoken for generations, to the comfort of a homeland that may have been theirs in the past. In doing so, they construct a new identity.[35]
The Baloch people face unique challenges contingent on the nation-state in which they reside. For example, in Iran, where the Baloch are thought to comprise more than two million are restricted from speaking Balochi freely and have been subjected in military operations by the Persian dominated state. The harsh oppression of the Iranian and Pakistani states has strengthened the Balochs’ will to pass on their heritage to coming generations. The Balochi language is both proof and symbol of the separate identity of the Baloch, and impressive efforts are made to preserve and develop it.[36] Having realized the significance of the language (Balochi) as the most determinant factor for the Baloch identity, the Persian and Punjabi dominated states of Iran and Pakistan have sought to “assimilate” the Baloch by all possible means.[37]
Globalization and the Baloch Identity
Since the early 2000, electronic media has been a continually changing forum for communicating, which has been taken up by the Baloch communities to maintain connections with their brethren all over the world. In that capacity, the technology has been an easy and innovative avenue for cultural expression. The Baloch, for instance, have established on-line magazines, newsgroups, human rights organizations, student groups, academic organizations and book publishers for a trans-national community. Some of these informative and insightful English media include: Balochistan TV,radiobalochi.org, balochvoice.com, balochunity.org, balochinews.com, zrombesh.org, baloch2000.orgetc. Based out of the country, they have significantly contributed to the development of the Baloch identity.
The revival of ethnic identity is converging with the emergence of continental political and economic units theoretically able to accommodate smaller national units within overarching political, economic, and security frameworks. The nationalist resurgence is inexorably moving global politics away from the present state system to a new political order more closely resembling the world’s ethnic and historical geography. Thus, the new world order may hold light of hope for oppressed ethnic communities, who have survived empires, colonization, nation building processes by brutal neighbors who systematically eroded them, reduced their existence to rival tribes. Therefore, contrary to the globalist argument, the new media are not eroding the sense of national identity but rather reinforcing and providing it with a broader and much independent context to an ethno cultural identity across the juridical boundaries of states to strengthen and solidify its distinct cultural identity.
Conclusion
There is a general consensus among the scholars about the Baloch community with regard to heterogeneity in Baloch political society, that voluntary association, independence, autonomy, equality and consultation had remained its basic principles and ingredients. It is the idea of an ever-ever land – emerging from an ancient civilization, united by a shared history, sustained by pluralistic way of life. In fact this way of life made it possible for people with different social realities come under the umbrella of a free, willingly accepted social and cultural code. The Baloch em braced and assimilated other minor groups to extend their strength. The pre sent-day Baloch are not a single race, but are a people of different origins, whose lan guage belong to the Iranian family of languages. They are mixed with Arabs in the South, Indians in the East, and with Turkmen and other Altaic groups in the North West.
The very survival of the Baloch, as a distinctive nation is characterised by decentralisation and diversity: diversity of racial origins, of dialects, of tribes and communities, of religions. But it’s diversity within a unity, provided by common tribal culture, common history, common experiences and common dreams. Thus, it is necessary to understand the forces of unity and the forces of divisiveness in relation to each other. These forces operate within the context of underlying conflicts and confrontations and under certain specific conditions. The Baloch identity is therefore developed to the extent that it manifests itself through a sense of belonging and a diversity of affiliations. The Baloch also recognize a shared place in history and common experiences. Similarly, social formations and shared economic interests have helped to shape the Baloch identity. And, finally, the baloch identity is shaped by specific, shared external challenges and conflicts.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Baloch, Inayatullah, The Problem of Greater Baluchistan: A Study of Baluch Nationalism, Stuttgart : Steiner Verlag Wiesbaden GMBH, 1987.
Baluch, Muhammad Sardar, History of Baluch Race and Baluchistan, Quetta : Khair – un -Nisa, Nisa Traders, Third Edition 1984;
Baluch, Muhammad Sardar, The Great Baluch: The Life and Times of Ameer Chakar Rind 1454- 1551 A .D., Quetta , 1965.
Breseeg,Taj Mohammad, Baloch Nationalism: Its Origin and Development, Karachi, Royal Book Company, 2004.
Harrison, Selig S., In Afghanistan’s Shadow: Baluch Nationalism and Soviet Temptations, New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1981.
Holdich, Thomas, The Gate of India : Being a Historical Narrative, London , 1910. Sabir Badalkhan, “A Brief Note of Balochistan”, unpublished, 1998. This ariticle was submitted to the Garland Encyclopedia of World Folklore, New York-London, (in 13 vols): vol. 5, South Asia, edited by Margaret Mills.
Hosseinbor, M. H., “Iran and Its Nationalities: The Case of Baluch Nationalism”, PhD. Thesis, The Amerikan university, 1984.
Jahani, Carina, “Poetry and Politics: Nationalism and Language Standardization in the Balochi Literary Movement” in: Paul Titus (ed.), Marginality and Modernity: Ethnicity and Change in Post-Colonial Balochistan, Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1996.
Kloos, Peter, “Secessionism in Europe in the Second Half of the 20th Century” in: Nadeem Ahmad Tahir (ed.), The Politics of Ethnicity and Nationalism in Europe and South Asia, Karachi , 1998.
Malik Allah-Bakhsh, Baluch Qaum Ke Tarikh ke Chand Parishan Dafter Auraq, Quetta :, Islamiyah Press, 20 September, 1957.
Possehl, Gergory L., Kulli: An Exploration of Ancient Civilization in Asia, Durham: Carolina Academic Press, 1986.
Rahman,Tariq, “The Balochi/Brahvi Language Movements in Pakistan ”, in: Journal of South Asian and Middle East Studies Vol. XIX, No.3, Spring 1996.
Spooner, Brian, “Baluchistan: Geography, History, and Ethnography” (pp. 598-632), In: Ehsan Yarshater, (ed), Encyclopadia Iranica, Vol. III, London – New York : Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1989.
The Foreign Policy Centre, Balochis of Pakistan : On the Margins of History, Foreign Policy Centre, London 2006.
The Gazetteer of Baluchistan: Makran, Quetta: Gosha-e Adab (repr. 1986).
The Imperial Gazetteer of India, vol. VI, Oxford : Calaredon Press, 1908.
INTERVIEWS:
Seraji, Mohammad Amin, leading political figure since 1950’s, from Iranian Kurdistan, was borne in September 1934, Mahabad Kurdistan, educated from the faculty of Law, University of Tehran . Interview made in Stockholm in April 2006, (on tape in Persian).
[1] Muhammad Sardar Khan Baluch, History of Baluch Race and Baluchistan, Quetta : Khair – un -Nisa, Nisa Traders, Third Edition 1984, p. 26.
[2] Inayatullah Baloch, The Problem of Greater Baluchistan, 1987, pp. 19-23; See also Janmahmad, Essays on Baloch National Struggle in Pakistan, p. 427.
[3] For a good description of the natural climate of Western Balochistan see Naser Askari, Moghadamahi Bar Shenakht-e Sistan wa Balochistan, Tehran: Donya-e Danesh, 1357/1979 pp. 3-14.
[4] Ibid., p. 9
[5] Taj Mohammad Breseeg, Baloch Nationalism: Its Origin and Development, Karachi, Royal Book Company, published in 2004, p. 64.
[6] Ibid., pp. 74-77.
[7] For more information, see Ibid., pp. 66-70.
[8] Gergory L. Possehl, Kulli: An Exploration of Ancient Civilization in Asia , pp. 58-61.
[9] Taj Mohammad Breseeg, Baloch Nationalism: Its Origin and Development, Karachi, Royal Book Company, published in 2004, p. 56.
[10] J. Hansman, “A Periplus of Magan and Melukha”, in BSOAS, London , 1973, p. 555; H. W. Balley, “Mleccha, Baloc, and Gadrosia”, in: BSOAS, No. 36, London , 1973, pp. 584-87. Also see, Cf. K. Karttunen, India in Early Greek Literature, Studia Orientalia, no. 65, Helsinki : Finnish Oriental Society, 1989, pp. 13-14.
[11] I. Afshar (Sistani), Balochistan wa Tamaddon-e Dirineh-e An, pp. 89-90.
[12] Etymology is the study of the history of words — when they entered a language, from what source, and how their form and meaning have changed over time. In languages with a long detailed history, etymology makes use of philology, the stu how words change from culture to culture over time. However, etymologists also apply the methods of comparative linguistics to reconstruct information about languages that are too old for any direct information (such as writing) to be known. By analyzing related languages with a technique known as the comparative method, linguists can make inferences, about their shared parent language and its vocabulary. In this way, word roots have been found which can be traced all the way back to the origin of, for instance, the Indo-European language family.
[13] An exonym is a name for a place that is not used within that place by the local inhabitants (neither in the official language of the state nor in local languages, or a name for a people or language that is not used by the people or language to which it refers. The name used by the people or locals themselves is called endonym . For example, Deutschland is an endonym; Germany is an English exonym for the same place.
[14] That is also the case with other similar names such as Kurdistan (the Kurdish homeland), Arabistan (the Arab homeland), Uzbakistan, etc. In these names, the Persian affix “istan” meaning land or territory is added to the name of its ethnic inhabitants.
[15] Yu. V. Gankovsky, The People of Pakistan : An ethnic history, pp. 147-8.
[16] Many prominent Baloch nationalists, such as Mir Gaus Bakhsh Bizenjo, Sardar Atuallah Megal, Gul Khan Nasir are Brahui-speaking.
[17] Breseeg, 2004, pp. 195-227.
[18] Ibid., pp. 92-95.
[19] The Foreign Policy Centre, Balochis of Pakistan : On the Margins of History, Foreign Policy Centre, London 2006.
[20] M. H. Hosseinbor, “ Iran and Its Nationalities: The Case of Baluch Nationalism”, pp. 45-46.
[21] Ibid., and see Breseeg, p. 109.
[22] The Imperial Gazetteer of India , vol. VI, Oxford : Calaredon Press, 1908, p. 275.
[23] Thomas Holdich, The Gate of India : Being an Historical Narrative, London , 1910, pp. 297-301. See also Dr. Sabir Badalkhan, “A Brief Note of Balochistan”, unpublished, 1998. This ariticle was submitted to the Garland Encyclopedia of World Folklore, New York-London, (in 13 vols): vol. 5, South Asia , edited by Margaret Mills.
[24] Ibid.
[25] For more detail, see Inayatullah Baloch, The Problem of Greater Baluchistan, pp. 89-125.
[26] Breseeg, 2004, pp. 248-51.
[27] It was in Makkuran that the early middle ages saw the first emergence of a distinctive Baloch culture and the establishment of the Baloch principalities and dynasties.
[28] Brian Spooner, Baluchistan: Geography, History, and Ethography p. 599.
[29] Breseeg, 2004, pp. 361-63, 296-98.
[30] Sir Denzil Ibbeston, The races, castes and tribes of the people in the report on the Census of Punjab, published in 1883, cited in: Muhammad Sardar Khan Baluch, The Great Baluch, pp. 83-100. It is important to note that the Baloch way of life influenced the way in which Islam was adopted. Up to tenth century as observed by the Arab historian Al-Muqaddasi the Baloch were Muslim only by name (Al-Muqaddasi, Ahsanul Thaqasim, quoted in Dost Muhammad Dost, The Languages and Races of Afghanistan, Kabul, 1975, p. 363.) Similarly, Marco Polo, at the end of the thirteenth century, remarls that some of people are idolators but the most part are Saracens (The Gazetteer of Baluchistan: Makran, p. 113).
[31] Malik Allah-Bakhsh, Baluch Qaum Ke Tarikh ke Chand Parishan Dafter Auraq, Quetta :, Islamiyah Press, 20 September, 1957 , p. 43.
[32] Tariq Rahman, “The Balochi/Brahvi Language Movements in Pakistan ”, in: Journal of South Asian and Middle East Studies Vol. XIX, No.3, Spring 1996, p. 88.
[33] Selig S. Harrison, In Afghanistan’s Shadow, p. 8.
[34] See Peter Kloos, “Secessionism in Europe in the Second Half of the 20th Century” in: Tahir, Nadeem Ahmad (ed.), The Politics of Ethnicity and Nationalism in Europe and South Asia, Karachi , 1998.
[35] Ibid.
[36] Carina Jahani, “Poetry and Politics: Nationalism and Language Standardization in the Balochi Literary Movement”, p. 110.
[37] Selig S. Harrison, In Afghanistan’s Shadow, pp. 95-96.

Balochistan's Unintended Fatal Contact with Pakistan

Balochistan's Unintended Fatal Contact with Pakistan

Reposted from The BalochWarna | August 11, 2012 | Story

By Dr. Shahswar K.
Initially there was no connection between Baluchistan and the phenomenon of Pakistan except one. This connection, as it happened, became one of the most disastrous and destructive calamity known to Baluch history. Baluch approached an Indian (Gujarati) lawyer Jinnah Poonja, later named as Mohammad Ali Jinnah, and then employed him as a legal advisor to Khan of Kalat. The main reason for employing a lawyer, however, was to pursue their deepest desire to regain their independence from Britain. To this end, they needed a professional legal adviser. Jinnah accepted the offer and acted as mouthpiece of the established order. His stance at this time was fundamentally at odd with the notion of Pakistan. In all probability, the thought of Pakistan had never crossed his mind or if it did he met it with a good deal of incredulity and disbelief. He was for peaceful coexistence of Hindus and Muslims under British rule.
The term “Pakistan” was coined by a number of Indian (Punjabi) Students in mid 1930s in London. The decade the term was invented was a decade of intense political and economic upheavals. The world had just experienced the greatest financial crash and barely a decade was passed from the end of the Second World War. Polarization of ideologies and political views were at their sharpest ends. Extremism was in vogue in all its shades and colours, the extremism of the left, the right, fascist and religious fundamentalism. The progressive camp, social democrats and liberals were retreating and were squeezed to one side. Religious fundamentalists saw fascism as a natural ally and showed great sympathy towards Hitler and his political philosophy at the time. Indian progressive political class congregated in Indian independence movement. The Indian Congress Party provided the platform for their anti-colonial struggle. It was at this historical juncture that the bizarre concept of “Pakistan” was invented. The doctrine of a “Nation of Islam” at any historical junction but more specifically in mid 1930s can only be a by-product of a specific mindset. It can only stem from one outlook and that is from a reactionary paranoid Muslim jihadist.
A nation cannot just be created by appeal to religious revelation or delirium. Nations are not formed by faith in messages of sacred or secular books. The constructive fallacy of the thought that a nation can be designed and manufactured out of divine scriptures or rational reasoning is self-refuting. Nations are formed over centuries or even over thousands of years. The quest for the ideal Islamic Nation as the perfect national model, merely as a thought is foolish and in practice is a monstrous crime. By all accounts “Pakistan” fits this description most accurately. Accordingly, the phenomenon of “Pakistan” is not just completely daft but it is also utterly counterintuitive. It does not contain an iota of rational reasoning and valid moral judgement.
Let us take Baluchistan or Kurdistan to throw some light in actual meaning of the terms used to describe these nations. Both terms are composed of two words. Baluchistan is composed of ‘Baluch’ and ‘stan’ and Kurdistan is composed of ‘Kurd’ and ‘stan.’ The formation of these terms was not a by-product of an act of religious hallucination or a pre-planned rational design. Literally, it has taken centuries for Baluch to settle on their homeland and manage to construct their unique language, culture, values, music, arts, literature, laws, and their economic and social institutions. The innermost secrets of their hearts, thinking and feelings are the product of their long history as a unifying social unit. The strength of their will, clarity of mind and objectives are therefore defined within this shared unity.
The nouns which end with the suffix ‘stan’ express the attribute of belonging. The noun combined with the suffix contains the name of the nation and the land where that nation inhabit. The prefix ‘Baluch’ in case of Baluchistan designates the nation and the suffix ‘stan’ their land. That is to say Baluchistan is the homeland of Baluch people. The term “Pakistan”, on the other hand, is a counterfeit notion. In reality it does not designate anything. This term does not exist in the languages of those nations who opted for creation of Pakistan. Moreover, there is no such an entity as a “Pakistani” nation. National identity is a voluntary expression of belonging and not a desire and a wish of a savage and pitiless conqueror or an empire to compel a true national identity to be called by another name.
The term “Pakistan” was coined with one clear intent. This was the brainchild of those mercenaries Indian Muslim who were convinced that they had been called to rule the subcontinent. They were among those who lived in luxury and splendour, and cared more for might and magnificence of Muslim rulers of India than democratic and human rights. This was the dominant thought of a small group of segregated Muslim elites who deluded themselves of being of superior species than other Indians. Pondering a bit more deeply into this flawed belief will reveal the exact intention behind the invention of the term “Pakistan.”
The term literally means the land of ‘clean or pure’ people. The prefix ‘Pak’ means pure and the suffix ‘stan’ means the land of clean people. The term contrasts two opposite entity. Clean in isolation does not exist. It is meaningless to talk about Pak (Pure) without an opposite point of reference. We understand the meaning of clean when it is compared with its opposite, which is unclean. The two are of a kind that gives meaning to each other. Disassociating one from its opposite will designate nothing. To think of a land of cleans will naturally be followed by a land that is inhibited by unclean people. Those who wish to break free means breaking free from the unclean people. In the historical context in which this term was then invented we find no other reasonable intention except this. Observing this with a critical eye and unbiased reflection leaves hardly a doubt about the sinister intent and racist nature of the term.
The term was coined when the Hitler’s Fascism was emerging as a major political force in Europe. It was particularly a major challenge to the British Empire. Needless to say that Nazi political philosophy struck a chord with Muslim Fundamentalism at the time. Those fundamentalist Indian students who came up with the idea of “Pakistan” were studying in England during this period and were exposed to Fascist political philosophy and their racial superiority creed. On the top of all this, Fascists and Muslim fundamentalists shared common political enemies. Liberals, social democrats and communists were their chief political opponents. Those who professed a ‘Nation of Islam’ under those momentous events at the time were among believers of segregation politics on ground of religion and race. The thought of curving an Islamic nation out of India with a draconian religious penal law can only then be the work of no other but a fundamentalist mind.
Hidden in this agenda was a sinister plan. When you create so called a ‘Nation’ and call it ‘Pakistan’ the land of clean out of India, you do not need to be an extraordinary logician to detect a sinister hidden agenda in the plan and also the sheer absurdity of the idea. This explicitly implies that you remove only the clean part of this unity, which you have already designated as the Muslim occupied part. But who were the rest of population in India that did not fall into circumference of this Muslim fundamentalist circle. By their reasoning they were the vast majority of Indian who were not Muslim. Can one not see a parallel between this and Fascist idea of superior race at the same time? Was it merely a coincidence or an intrinsically shared philosophy but merely expressed in religious tone?
The Indian Muslim students who came to study in England were from exceptionally privileged class. They undoubtedly practiced the cast system and regarding themselves to be from a superior race in India. Under such political environment and ideological position what would be the intention of inventing a term that is plainly regards a section of the same society as ‘clean’ and another section as ‘unclean.’ This fact cannot be denied. Those deny it or have denied it consciously or unconsciously have subsequently overlooked the unconceivable amount of death, destruction and misery that this fake Frankenstein state and its creed has brought so far.
The sheer absurdity of the whole shenanigan experiment does not end just with the term itself. It goes all the way to the process of creation of Pakistan also. Muslim League, the religious party that led the formation of Pakistan was not a genuine grass-root political party. It was a by-product of British Empire. In order to counter the growing influence of Indian secular, liberal and socialist political parties who were demanding independence, British created this religious party.
The party’s leader, M. A. Jinnah who became the founder of Pakistan had very close relation with the British Raj. Until 1946 he categorically rejected the idea of creation of a separate Muslim nation. Jinnah was born on 25 December 1876 in a prosperous Gujarati merchant family. His father was Jinnahbai Poonja and his mother Mithibai. His grandfather, Poonja Gokuldas Meghji, changed his religion and converted from Hindu to Islam. As a family they were the followers of the Ismaili Khoja. In the later years Jinnah also changed religion and converted to a more dominant branch of shia Islam. His family spoke Gujarati at home and Jinnah after completing his early studies in Karachi and Bombay went to England and studied law in London.
London left him with life changing impression. He imitated and adopted the lifestyle of the British ruling class and ostentatiously acted accordingly. This imitation comprised almost every aspect of his daily life including the language he chose to speak at home. Jinnah first joined the Indian National Congress but left this party for Muslim League in 1913. Three years later, in 1916, he became the president of Muslim League.
Jinnah advocated the unity of India until 1946. As it became too obvious for everyone that the days of British Empire were numbered in India Mr Jinnah leaned towards the division of India. The green light and encouragement of the British authorities in dividing India on religious ground did also play a significant role in his decision. Above anything else Jinnah was a calculated Machiavellian imposter. The most palpable truth about him was that he was not faithful to his word. He employed the notions of humanity, democracy, freedom, equality and rule of law just as tools to serve his personal interest. On one hand he invited his missionaries for a dream of holy Islamic empire and on the other hand for equality, liberty and justice. As an ardent apostle of British Empire he adored the British superiority and their right to keep the vanquished subjugated but at the same time he called for an independent Islamic nation when it suited him. He proposed the Islamic constitution while pretending to be an adherent of secular politics. He imposed a language that none of the nations that comprised the boundary of Pakistan spoke. All in all, he was capricious, illiberal, and unjust man. He harboured tyranny, bigotry, intolerance, superstition and religious fanaticism as and when benefited him.
The devastating plight of Eastern Balochistan is invariably linked with this individual and this was the only link that Baluchistan had with the phenomenon of Pakistan. Baluch gradually but increasingly were moving forward to formation a unified nation from fourteenth and fifteenth century. They succeeded to unify their nation by 1666 and their unified state lasted until 1839. It was during this year that the army of British Empire invaded Baluchistan. The British remained in Baluchistan by being able to impose several agreements bilaterally to give their illegal occupation a feel of legitimacy.
The British rulers with these treaties undermined the inherent democratic rights of Baloch nation and its future economic, political, legal and cultural prospects. They also divided Baluchistan illegally in three parts by drawing two arbitrary lines. In 1871, they drew the ‘Goldsmith Line’ and by this line they divided Baluchistan in two parts. They kept the Eastern part of Baluchistan under their own control and the Western Baluchistan was given to the Persian rulers. In 1893, they draw another line the ‘Durand Line’ by which a segment of Northern part of Baluchistan was given to Afghanistan.
Despite being divided into three parts, Baluch have never stopped their struggle to acquire their democratic rights. They have fought ceaselessly to end the illegal occupation of their homeland. All Baluch persistently joined forces against British occupiers to liberate themselves. From 1920s onwards their struggle was elevated into a more advanced political movement. They embarked in a modern political struggle by setting up political organizations and associations for the first time in the history of Baluchistan. The overriding reason for adopting a modern method and mechanism of struggle was specifically to hasten the pace of attaining their independence. It was in accordance with this line of political struggle that in mid 1930s leading Baluch political activists contacted an Indian lawyer. The foremost objective behind this decision was to employ a lawyer to go after regaining independence through legal means.
Baluch did not have a lawyer. A few young political activists who lacked sufficient resources, experience and education could not challenge the British state and their associates in Baluchistan. That is why they approached Mr Jinnah. The reason that they approached him was not because he was a man of reason, of real merit and distinction but because of his religious belief. He was known as a Muslim lawyer. Otherwise, Baluch virtually had no knowledge of his politics, personality, his background and his professional integrity and competency.
His employment was solely on an ad hoc basis. In this capacity he was an employee of the state of Kalat from 1936 to 1946. He was paid handsomely and treated with the utmost respect, courtesy and Baluch hospitality. In return he did not just do anything as far as the issue of independence went but as soon as he became the head of the state of Pakistan he showed his true character. He was at once transformed into a vicious, wicked, charlatan tyrant. Jinnah expressed no doubt on the validity of the innate legal rights of Baluch to regain their independence as long as the British were in Baluchistan. As soon as Pakistan was created and British left Baluchistan his stance on Baluchistan changed completely. He launched a neo-colonial policy to erase all traces of Baluch nation and transform Baluchistan to a den of slavery. Subsequently, his plan of obedience made by compulsion led to subjugation of Baluchistan once again and has caused irreparable losses to Baluch.
The military and administrative apparatus that Pakistan inherited was the one the British Raj left behind. They were the same trusted personnel that kept the British colonial power running in India. Jinnah employed this repressive military machinery to compel Baluch to merge with Pakistan. But there was absolutely no incentive whatsoever in the idea and prospect of Pakistan to induce the Baluch to swap their freedom for a barbarous, warmongering, zealous fanatic state. Baluch knew the nature of the newly created state of Pakistan and history has proved how accurate they were. Jinnah in the end resorted to military force to subdue Baluch.
What Mr Jinnah did to Baluch nation reminds one to one particular bird. This bird is classified as a brood parasite that belongs to Cuckoo family. All species in this family are not brood parasites. Only a sizable minority behave as brood parasites. When these birds are about to lay egg they lay their eggs in the nests of other birds i.e. Dunnocks, Meadow Pipits, and Reed Warblers. Their eggs are incubated by these host species. Once the eggs are hatched since the Cuckoo chick is considerably bigger and stronger than the native birds it will confiscate all the food brought to the nest. As the host chicks are made to starve they get weaker and in due course the Cuckoo ejects the host chicks one by one by pushing them over the nest. The chicks fallen to the ground face death and hence, the squatter parasite deprive the lawful residents of the nest the right to life altogether. After eliminating the legitimate occupants, the Cuckoo will have the entire nest to itself and also will have the parents exclusively under its control. Jinnah and his subsequent followers have not just acted in the same way as this brood parasite in Baluchistan but unlike this parasite that limits its cruelty to the legitimate occupant chicks they have aimed at complete extermination and genocide of Baluch nation.
If it was not for Jinnah there would be no connection between Baluchistan and the Islamic state of Pakistan. Over ten years of working for the state of Kalat, Jinnah discovered all weaknesses and strengths of the Baluch political system and also the vast resources of Baluchistan and its strategic location. Even some months before the division of Indian subcontinent he was not sure about the final decision of the British regarding creation of Pakistan. When he signed the agreement that was between the state of Kalat and the British, he explicitly recognised Baluchistan as an independent and sovereign state. During this time he was still in a state of shock and disbelief that he could be the head of a separate state from India and his authority would not be undermined by giant political figures such as Gandhi and Nehru. To pretend that the creation of Pakistan is in accordance to the democratic principle of the right of self-determination he signed the agreement that returned the sovereignty of Baluchistan’s state to Baluch people. It could have been mark of outmost folly, at the time, had he not signed the agreement.
As soon as Pakistan was created and he became its general governor he changed his mind as he did so often when it served his interest. Duplicity was his motto. This was the fatal connection between Baluchistan and the British colonial progeny, Pakistan. Jinnah knew the grave weaknesses of the political and military establishment of the state of Baluchistan. He knew that the ordinary Baluch and its tiny educated elite would not go under bondage of another even more brutal and corrupt colonial power. Pakistan ruling establishment then invested their time and resources in some non-Baluch individuals. These individuals were as one would expect British devotees employed to rule Baluchistan but as British Empire was leaving they switched political allegiance and overnight and became the most fanatic advocate of Islamic state of Pakistan. Jinnah found his support for Pakistan among these individuals and a few very ignorant, gullible, greedy and insecure Baluch Khans and Sardars. These people knew well that in a free and democratic Baluchistan they would not enjoy the same status and prestige so they sided with Jinnah’s colonial plan.
One can safely say that those few who sided with Pakistan plan were mostly non-Baluch but both Baluch and non-Baluch individuals who sided with Pakistan were among the most backward, uninformed and undemocratic section of Baluch society. In contrast, the Baluch at large and their representative in both Baluchistan assemblies categorically rejected Jinnah’s immoral and illegal plan. They knew their democratic rights and they were far more progressive and democratic in their outlook than the whole political and ideological machinery that created Pakistan. Pakistan and its political and military could not convince Baluch and their legitimate leaders through democratic rational debate and discussion so they had to rely on brute force. Thus, if it was not for Jinnah Baluchistan now would not be a colony of Punjabi military establishment. If it was not for this connection Baluchistan would not have endured all untold destruction, killing and misery at the hand of Pakistani state and military. Pakistan is simply an illegal occupier. One must be completely blind or totally ignorant to deny this fact. Pakistan has no right to be in Baluchistan. The Baluch nation will not be free, democratic and prosperous as long as Baluchistan remains under colonial grip of the occupying states of Pakistan and Iran. Dr Shahswar K is a Baloch political and Human Rights activist. He is Senior Lecturer in Economics at London Metropolitan University, UK. He the author of "Money and its Origins"

Balochistan and the upcoming elections.

Balochistan and the upcoming elections

Reposted from The Express Tribune | August 30, 2012 | Story

The Baloch nationalists are debating among themselves whether or not to participate in the upcoming general elections. So, is Balochistan’s political landscape going to change if the nationalists return to parliament? All nationalists are not on the same page on this crucial question, nor are they all equally capable of normalising the situation in the province.
The moderate National Party (NP), which boasts about its middle class composition, has publicly acknowledged that it committed a “blunder” by boycotting the 2008 elections because they were immediately replaced by local rivals from the Balochistan National Party-Awami (BNP-Awami). In March 2009, the NP eventually returned to parliament by getting its leader, Hasil Bizenjo, elected as a senator with the help of the PPP, the PML-Q and some independent MPAs.
The Balochistan National Party (BNP) has still not decided to contest elections but its decision is very critical. The BNP, headed by former chief minister Sardar Akhtar Mengal, is caught up in a dilemma for three reasons.
Firstly, Baloch armed groups oppose the idea of elections, integration and reconciliation with Islamabad. The BNP is not a contributor to the armed insurgency. Street politics is its strongest point and a decision to participate in the elections will directly pit it against the hardline Baloch groups. Secondly, the party fears its exiled president will be assassinated on his return to Pakistan, just like Habib Jalib, the party’s secretary general. Opposition to General (retd) Pervez Musharraf had landed Sardar Mengal in a Karachi jail for 20 months. Thirdly, the BNP blames the security establishment for creating anti-nationalist underground armed groups such as the Baloch Musla Defai Tanzeem to attack the anti-government nationalists. This group has killed several senior BNP leaders, including three members of its central committee. It seems impossible for the BNP to run a safe election campaign under constant fear of assault and disruption by armed groups allegedly affiliated with the intelligence agencies.
The BNP will probably participate in the elections only if powerful elements in the security apparatus assure them that no more attacks would be carried out on the party’s leaders and activists during the election campaign. Participation in the polls, nonetheless, does not guarantee nationalists’ landslide electoral victory. They are very likely to lose for the following reasons.
The nationalist parties have not exercised street politics for the past many years. The absence of key leaders such as Sardar Mengal of the BNP has totally disconnected the ordinary Baloch voter from their leaders. These parties also did not show any interest in the preparation of the voters’ lists. Their rural voters are not even listed nor do many of them possess computerised identity cards. Political parties normally require at least one year to prepare for the elections whereas the Baloch nationalists do not seem to have fully completed their homework yet.
Furthermore, there is simply no ‘sympathy vote’ in Baloch districts for the nationalists. The ‘kill and dump’ policies, for which intelligence agencies and the Frontier Corps are blamed, have increased support for armed groups among ordinary Balochs. They look at parliament and elections as a source of further strengthening the power of the state. The relatives of the killed or disappeared political activists support insurgent groups, instead of pro-parliament parties, in reaction to the killing of their loved ones.
Finally, Baloch tribal chiefs from the PPP, the PML-Q and the BNP-Awami have accumulated so much wealth from the official treasury that it is practically impossible for the nationalists to have the same amount of finances to run election campaigns. Access to official machinery further benefits the current legislators against the nationalists.
The elections will be a futile exercise if there is no change in the current composition of the Balochistan Assembly. The status quo did not change after the 2008 elections and a similar outcome this time will further block a ballot-driven solution for the Balochistan conflict. The government should make sure that intelligence agencies do not finance and influence the elections so that neutral results are achieved.
The writer has served as a former bureau chief of the Daily Times in Quetta and was granted asylum in the US after threats to his life in Pakistan.

Balochistan after Bugti

Balochistan after Bugti

Reposted from Express Tribune | August 26, 2012 | Story

By Sanaullah Baloch
Balochistan plunged into a frightening crisis after the cold-blooded murder of Nawab Akbar Khan Bugti. On August 26, 2006, the Pakistani flag was raised at the Bugti fort with the proclamation of a new dawn for Balochistan. Nonetheless, in 2012, six years later, Balochistan is deeply engulfed in dusk and darkness.
Let’s look at the situation in Dera Bugti, which is no longer a liveable place. The Bugti fort, the Baloch Nawab’s residence, which used to be a place of Baloch hospitality, has been turned into a Gulag where Baloch activists and government opponents are detained and tortured. The government’s proclaimed “Operation Freedom” brought new multilayer enslavement for the Bugtis. Along with a brutal security apparatus, countless criminals have popped up in the area. The resource-rich but terrifically impoverished district has been virtually divided into many sub-states controlled by government-backed criminals and armed groups.
This policy of criminalisation is extended to the entire province. Islamabad has failed to win the sympathy of the courageous Baloch masses against its ruthless policies as government agencies have extended their support to petty criminals and devastated the very social and harmonious fabric of Baloch society. Since the start of the military operation in 2002, around 10,000 people have been killed, a quarter million people have been displaced, 4,000 are missing and 600 have been killed extrajudicially. According to a recent official report of the interior ministry, at least 868 people have been killed, 619 kidnapped and 2,390 have gone missing from the province since 2010. Furthermore, 600 bodies of Baloch activists have been found in different parts of Balochistan.
Prior to full-fledged military offensives, Balochistan’s poverty incidence stood at 48 per cent in 2001-02, which was an exceptional 15 percentage points higher than the national average. By 2005-06 poverty incidence stood at 50.9 per cent, compared with a national average of 2.3 per cent. After Islamabad’s ‘development and civilisation’ mission in Balochistan, the poverty incidence now stands at 63 per cent, three times higher than the national average. After limited economic opportunities, severe floods and restrictions on international relief organisations, the caloric poverty in Balochistan was recorded around 74 per cent in 2011, compared with 49.7 per cent in 2001-02.
Impoverished Balochistan is also famous for establishment-backed filthy corrupt politicians. Given that the government fully relies on criminals, gangsters and religious elements, including morally shattered chieftains, corruption has been institutionalised in the last 10 years as an incentive for the followers of Islamabad’s dirty policies.
During the last six years, abduction has become a big business in the province. Gangsters choose individuals without any fear. Most of these criminals claim to have links with the government. According to the Balochistan government’s official figures, between June 2011 and February 2012, 170 people were abducted, out of which 142 were released after paying heavy ransoms. During the last four years, 50 Hindus were abducted in different parts of Balochistan. Ever since government agencies were preoccupied with abducting and intimidating the moderate political stratum of the Baloch society, criminals are having a luxurious time creating their desired level of chaos and lawlessness. Islamabad’s failure to address the mounting dissatisfaction in Balochistan and deal with political unrest through political means led to the killings of hundreds of innocent Baloch, Punjabis and Hazaras.
Sectarian killings have taken a new toll; many extremist groups are taking advantage of the political vacuum created after the ruthless operation. Over 700 Baloch Hazaras have been killed in cold blood. The last 10 years of defective re-engineering of the social, political and economic fabric of the Baloch society has proved destructive. Unfortunately, the establishment in Islamabad is ignorant of this fact and continues to pursue the unchanged policy of denial and negligence towards Balochistan.
The writer is a Baloch leader who resigned from the Upper House in protest against Islamabad’s discriminatory policies against Baloch people. He can be reached at balochbnp@gmail.com

here’s life after divorce

here’s life after divorce

Reposted from Dawn.com | August 20, 2012 | Story

By Irfan Husain
I trudged up the trail to the top of Chamcook Mountain a couple of days ago, and was pleased to see that I could still make it to the top without too much huffing and puffing. Let me hasten to add that technically speaking, Chamcook is not really a mountain as it’s only 637 feet high, so it doesn’t exactly need super fitness and ropes and pitons to climb up. But don’t tell the locals that their beloved Chamcook is only a hill.
Once you are up there on the peak, the views are magnificent, with the wide sweep of the St Croix River on one side, and Fundy Bay on the other. On a clear day, we can see the American state of Maine in the distance. New Brunswick is a verdant state on the east coast of Canada, and is home to only around 750,000 people. Driving along, there is hardly any traffic, and the sense of vast spaces is overwhelming.
Every two years, a friend lends us his lovely holiday home in the tiny town of St Andrews, and at night we can hear the tide rising swiftly in the bay. Often, we can see deer feeding placidly on the property. Canadians are a very civil people, and I am invariably greeted with a ‘hello’ or a ‘good morning’ by total strangers. If I am waiting to cross the street, drivers will often stop their cars and signal me to go ahead.
The place is so remote and cut off that the temptation to switch off the news from the rest of the world is great. But local papers are full of the coming elections in Quebec. This French-majority province has long been mired in a debate over independence, with many Quebecois clamouring for their own nation where they can govern without interference from Anglo-Saxon Ottawa.
However, this desire to separate from Canada is now largely confined to the older generation who tend to speak only French.
Younger people are usually bi-lingual, and often move to Toronto with its cosmopolitan character and greater opportunities.
Other Canadians cynically point out that Quebec is a deficit state subsidised by Ottawa, and profess to be pleased at the prospect of the French-speaking territory going its own way.
This debate is echoed to an extent in Britain where there is a campaign being waged by First Minister Salmond for an independent Scotland.
It already has its own parliament, but there is a growing demand for statehood. Many Scots argue that if they were to retain the revenues from the North Sea oil that is being brought up from its territorial waters, they would not need any subsidies from London.
The issue is highly contentious, with Salmond being accused of playing to the populist gallery. Currently, around a third of all Scots favour independence, and the Yes Scotland movement hopes to convert enough people to win the referendum scheduled in two years.
The point here is that in two countries, the discussion about the possible separation of member provinces is being conducted in a reasonable, rational way. No troops have been sent into Quebec or Scotland to crush separatists. Both countries realise that in this day and age, it’s not the end of the world if members of a union decide to go their own way. In other words, there is life after divorce.
In Pakistan, it seems we have learned no lessons from our disastrous failure to keep East Pakistan in the federation. Hundreds of thousands died in West Pakistan’s bloody attempt to save a failed marriage. We appear to be travelling the same route now in Balochistan.
I have met many people who point out to the large subsidies the province receives from Islamabad, but this misses the point: if enough Baloch feel they no longer wish to remain in the federation, it’s time to take them seriously and begin talking about alternatives. Sending in more troops is to increase their sense of alienation.
It is entirely possible that when offered independence, many Baloch might wish to reconsider their options. But clearly, endless force is no solution. Thus far, no mainstream political party has seriously engaged with the province and its problems other than offering vague apologies and promises. Successive federal governments have simply tried to buy off local sardars in the expectation that they will be able to keep their tribes in check, and maintain the status quo.
There has been much dark talk about foreign interference in Balochistan that is fuelling the separatist flames. While this is entirely possible, outsiders can only influence events if there is fertile soil to assist their efforts. In Balochistan, there has long been a nationalist streak that has been repeatedly suppressed by state violence.
As we can see in the Canadian and British examples, civilised dialogue and debate are far better options than force. Currently, our military response has led not just to great hardship among the Baloch, but has also precipitated counter-violence against peaceful non-Baloch settlers. Clearly, this bloodshed cannot be endlessly accepted, specially at a time when our armed forces are fighting a brutal insurgency in the tribal areas against extremist militants.
The difference between the Baloch situation and the debate over separatism in Canada and Britain is that in the latter two countries, it is the political leadership that has been conducting the discussion.
Needless to say, in Pakistan it is the army that is in charge, and soldiers tend to think that force is the answer to all political problems. They need only to recall the events of 1971 to see how misplaced their faith in their guns really is.
There are fears in Islamabad that deprived of gas from Balochistan’s Sui area, Pakistan’s energy problems would be exacerbated.
But Britain depends heavily on North Sea oil, and is not using this as an excuse to deny Scots their right to secede if the majority so decides two years from now.
In this day and age, people cannot be held down by force indefinitely. Like the Quebecois and the Scots, the Baloch should be allowed to decide their own future.

The Accession of Kalat: Myth and Reality

The Accession of Kalat: Myth and Reality

Published 2006 | Reposted from The Balochistan Discussion Series: Reading Material

By Dushka H. Saiyid Professor Dushka Saiyid is Allama Iqbal Fellow at Wolfson College, University of Cambridge, United Kingdom.
When the Dar-ul-Awam met on February 21, 1948, it decided not to accede, but to negotiate a treaty to determine Kalat’s future relations with Pakistan. According to one report, the Afghan government was also interested in coming to an agreement with the Khan on their own terms.

Photo source : Leading Baloch nationalist politicians gather on the balcony of the National Awami Party headquarters in Quetta awaiting the arrival of Khan Wali Khan in the 1970s.
Baluchistan formed the western borderlands of the British India. What the British sought here was not political dominion, but suzerainty, as the cheapest and most efficient way of controlling the area inhabited by fiercely independent tribes. This did not require direct administration of British India.1
Baluchistan that Pakistan inherited consisted of three types of territory. First, there was a long strip of territory separating Baluchistan from Afghanistan and the Northwest Frontier Province, which was directly administered by the British. The purpose of this territory was to have a buffer to isolate the Baluch tribes from their neighbours. Then there were districts leased from the Khan of Kalat after the original annexation. Both these territories, the leased and the directly administered strip, were under the control of Chief Commissioner. Chiefs, who had treaty relationships with the British, controlled the rest of Baluchistan. They had internal independence but the Government of India controlled their external relations. The Khan of Kalat was the most important of these chiefs, whose territories were divided amongst a number of feudatories with different levels of independence. Three of these feudatories – Makran, Las Bela and Kharan – had emerged as separate political entities by 1947, and with Kalat formed the Baluchistan States Union. They were something more than tribes, but less than states.2
The Viceroy to India, Lord Lytton, invited the Khan of Kalat to attend the imperial assemblage at Delhi in January 1877. A nationalist historian has argued that the British regarded the Khan of Kalat as independent because on this occasion he was not given a flag like the other princes. Moreover, the Viceroy received the Khan and the Sultan of Oman and also paid them return visits. None of these gestures was made to other princes, he argues, because they were not regarded as independent.3 However, British policy changed with the ascension of Abdur Rehman as the Amir of Kabul in the late nineteenth century, when Afghanistan became pro-British. Sir J. Brown, who was the successor of Sandeman, deposed the independent Khan and had Mir Mahmud II installed as the Khan of Kalat. The British also framed a new constitution for Kalat.4
In 1942 the Khan wrote to the Cripps Mission and forwarded the case of an independent Khanate of Baluchistan. In the same year, the Secretary of State for India informed the Viceroy about the British policy towards the Khanate, denying its status as an independent, sovereign, and a non-Indian state. The decision of the Government of India was conveyed to the Khan in June 1942. The British gave legal arguments, which were not contested by the Khan. The Khan re-opened the question in 1946 at the end of the Second World War.5
The Accession
Kalat did not feature large in the competition between India and Pakistan for the accession of princely states at the time of the partition. Since it was on the periphery of the Indian sub-continent, it did not hold the same importance as Kashmir or Hyderabad, or even Junagadh. Nor did it have the conflict of the ruler belonging to one faith while its population belonged to another, as both were Muslim. However, the Quaid-i-Azam had promised Kalat and other princely states independence, if they acceded to Pakistan. Independence in this context meant that foreign affairs, defence and communications would be handled by Pakistan.
The Prime Minister of Kalat, Muhamed Aslam, went to meet the Nawab of Bhopal, the Chancellor of the Chamber of Princes, in December 1946 to discuss the future status of Kalat state. He gave an account of this meeting in a letter to Lancelot Griffin, Assistant to the Crown Representative.6 The meeting, he said, was to discuss Kalat’s three concerns once the British had withdrawn: the relationship of Kalat with India and the rest of the world, the return of the leased areas of Nushki, Quetta and Nasirabad to Kalat, and the future of the feudatory states like Las Bela and Kharan, and the tribal areas like the Bugti and Marri territories.7 The letter recounts all the treaties concluded between Kalat and the British Government in India, and then quotes from Article 3 of the Treaty of 1876 that binds the British Government “to respect the independence of Kalat”, and that this Treaty is in force at the present time.8
The same letter to Lancelot Griffin said that the Government of India Act of 1935 held the Kalat state as situated in India, but argued that the state was not consulted in the drafting of this Act, and in response the Khan of Kalat had written to the Crown Representative protesting the infringement of the Treaty of 1876. The Crown Representative had replied that he recognized the 1876 Treaty as valid which would form the basis of the relationship of Kalat and the British Government. 9
The letter also discussed the future of the territories leased from Kalat by the British, and that when the British relinquished control of these areas, they should be restored to the Khan of Kalat, their rightful owner. It argued that the Khan was the head of the Baluch Confederacy, and the suzerain of the Kharan and Las Bela states, and that all Baluch tribes are anxious to preserve their “national existence” and stay out of the Indian Union.10 Muhamed Aslam said that the Chancellor of the Chamber of Princes had appreciated the point of view that Kalat could not be party to any formal negotiations conducted by the Negotiating Committee of the Chamber of Princes with the Constituent Assembly, without compromising its position as an independent state in the Treaty of 1876.11
As the Viceroy, Lord Mountbatten, sought to settle the question of accession of all princely states, Kalat was the subject of a meeting on July 19, 1947. At this meeting Lord Mountbatten, the Crown Representative, said that those districts which all acknowledged to be administered by Kalat were Mekran, Jhalawan, Sarawan, Kachhi, Dombki and Kaheri. He also said that Las Bela and Kharan were disputed, as their rulers claimed not to be under the suzerainty of the Khan of Kalat.12.
At this meeting, the Prime Minister of Kalat, Nawabzada Aslam Khan, claimed that the relationship of Kalat with the British Government was defined in the Treaty of 1876 as one of an independent, sovereign state. While the Viceroy said he would accept this only for the purposes of negotiations, Nishtar, the Pakistan government representative said that he would not contest this claim.
Lord Mountbatten said that the four territories of Quetta, Nushki, Nasirabad and Bolan, which had been leased by Kalat to the British Government in India, were the issues at hand. The Kalat representative claimed that with the transfer of power, these should be returned to Kalat. The Government of Pakistan’s claim was “based on the grounds that the successor authorities in India would, in relation to foreign states, inherit all Treaty obligations incurred on behalf of India, and the Pakistan Government would be heir to the obligations (both burdens and benefits) arising out of treaties with Kalat, as they would be, for example, to the Anglo-Afghan Treaty of 1921”.13
The Viceroy also maintained he had been advised that, according to international law, treaties such as these were inherited by the successor states, while treaties with states over which the Crown had exercised paramountcy, would lapse and could not be transferred to successor states. He also said that provision had been made for this in the Indian Independence Bill. It was agreed between all parties present that the Khan of Kalat and the Quaid-i-Azam should discuss the matter.14 It seems quite clear that the Government of Pakistan did not want any doubt to be cast about its retention of the leased areas, which included Quetta, the most important city of Baluchistan, and also the centre of communications. The recognition of Kalat’s indepen-dence put Pakistan in a strong legal position to inherit the leased areas from British India.
It was at the same meeting of July 19, 1947 that the Viceroy Lord Mountbatten mentioned that the status of Kharan and Las Bela was disputed as the rulers of these two states claimed not to be under the suzerainty of the Khan of Kalat.15
While discussing the future of Kalat, Lord Mountbatten said that he would meet the representatives of the other princely states and suggest to them that they should adhere to one or the other of the Dominions. The Union of India had reduced its demand for adherence to the states only to the subjects of defence, communications and foreign affairs. He further said that since there were only few such states in the case of Pakistan, Mr Jinnah was willing to discuss the question of the method and degree of adherence with each individually.16 He went on to argue that paramountcy would lapse with the transfer of power, and states would become independent de jure, but de facto very few were likely to benefit from it. He said that adherence to a Dominion was the only way of maintaining some form of relationship between the Crown and the states. He advised Kalat that although it had liberty of choice, it should associate with Pakistan on some terms.17 The Prime Minister of Kalat, Aslam Khan’s responded that the Khan of Kalat wanted to come to an amicable settlement with Pakistan, which would be of mutual benefit.
The minutes of the same meeting reveal the Khan of Kalat claimed that Jinnah had asked him whether he would be willing to send representatives to the Pakistan Constituent Assembly, but he had responded in the negative, saying it would not be possible because of Kalat’s independent status. However, more importantly, the Khan had agreed with Jinnah that an understanding must be reached between Kalat and Pakistan on defence, external affairs and communications. The Viceroy opined that agreement on these subjects was essential.18
A series of meetings between the Viceroy, as the Crown’s Representative, the Quaid and the Khan of Kalat followed, which resulted in a communique on August 11, 1947. The communique stated that:
a. The Government of Pakistan recognizes Kalat as an independent sovereign state in treaty relations with the British Government with a status different from that of Indian States.
b. Legal opinion will be sought as to whether or not agreements of leases will be inherited by the Pakistan Government.
c. Meanwhile, a Standstill Agreement has been made between Pakistan and Kalat.
d. Discussions will take place between Pakistan and Kalat at Karachi at an early date with a view to reaching decisions on Defence, External Affairs and Communications.
While the Quaid on behalf of the Government of Pakistan agreed to recognize Kalat as an independent and a sovereign State, the Khan of Kalat tried to get the Crown Representative to do so as well. The Crown Representative refused on the basis of an advice from his political adviser, saying: “The Treaties of 1854 and 1876 do not lead to the inference that Kalat is an independent sovereign state and it has in fact, always been regarded as an Indian state. It figures as such in Part II of the 1st Schedule of the Government of India Act of 1935…”19 He then went onto express the hope that “a close understanding between Pakistan and Kalat on matters concerning foreign affairs, communications and defence, analogous to the understandings between the Government of the Dominion of India and the States which have acceded to it.”
It is clear from the draft communique and the UK High Commissioner’s letter discussing it that not only was the British Government unhappy with Pakistan’s recognition of Kalat as an independent and a sovereign State, but it also did not want it to become a precedent. Hodson has repeatedly argued that Mountbatten’s main motivation in preventing the states from exercising the independence option was his concern that it would lead to the fragmentation of India.
Lawrence Grafftey-Smith, High Commissioner of the UK in Pakistan, while commenting on the draft communiqe, expressed grave reservations about Pakistan’s recognition of Kalat’s independence, saying: “Nothing we could do to prevent the Government of Pakistan from recognizing Kalat’s independent status although this step seems to be of doubtful political wisdom and contrary to our interests elsewhere.” He goes on to explain the cause of his discomfiture, saying: “This precedent may well encourage Hyderabad in maintaining its claim to independence in its negotiations with the Government of India…the admission of Kalat’s claim means the emergence of a weak buffer state on the frontiers of Afghanistan, Iran and Pakistan”.20 It has been argued that Mountbatten was against any state becoming independent and harried them into acceding to one of the Dominions because he feared the fragmentation of India.21
A memo by Arthur Henderson, the Minister of State for Commonwealth Relations Office, hinted at the advantage to Pakistan of recognising the independence of Kalat, saying: “Pakistan has entered into negotiations with Kalat on the basis of recognizing the State’s claim to independence and of treating the previous agreements between the Crown and Kalat providing for the lease of Quetta and other areas, which would otherwise lapse under Section 7(1)(b) of the Indian Independence Act, as international agreements untouched by the termination of Paramoutcy.”22 The memorandum further state: “The UK High Commissioner in Pakistan is being informed of the position and asked to do what he can to guide the Pakistan Government away from making any agreement with Kalat which would involve recognition of the State as a separate international entity.” It also discussed the effect of the policy that Pakistan had adopted towards Kalat on the state of Kashmir: “One consequence might well be that the Pakistan Government would be obliged to concede to Kashmir a similar recognition, although Kashmir has certainly never been independent, having been created by the British for the present dynasty on the conclusion of the Sikh wars and is hardly equipped to maintain the international responsibilities of an independent State vis-а-vis its neighbours, Russia and China”.23
The Khan wanted both issues of the state’s accession to Pakistan and the future of the leased areas to be settled simultaneously. It is argued that he would have preferred to have treaty relations with Pakistan as an independent state, rather than sign the Instrument of Accession, but might have agreed to the latter if was offered favourable terms in respect of the leased areas. At least this was the understanding of Sir Grafftey-Smith.24
Grafftey-Smith mentions in his memo of September 24, 1947 to the Commonwealth Relations Office that a draft Instrument of Accession has been sent to the Khan of Kalat, and it is in the same form as the Junagadh Instrument, but that the Khan is unlikely to accept it.25 Referring to a Savingram No. 55 of October 17, 1947 from Grafftey-Smith, the Political Department, in a note on Pakistan-Kalat negotiations, says that Jinnah has had second thoughts regarding the recognition of Kalat as an independent sovereign state, and is now desirous of obtaining its accession in the same form as was accepted by other rulers who joined Pakistan. The same note mentions that an interesting situation is developing as Pakistan might accept the accession of Kalat’s two feudatories, Las Bela and Kharan, and points out that this is like Junagadh, where India is negotiating directly with Mangrol. However, it says, the significant difference between the two situations is that the Crown Representative recognised Kharan and Las Bela as independent states prior to August 15, 1947, which was not the case with Mangrol.26 The note also mentions that the Khan has assured Jinnah of having no intention of opening negotiations with Iran, Afghanistan or India, but observed that the situation would become very difficult if the Khan attempted to open negotiations with New Delhi.
On August 15, 1947 when the British withdrew from India, the Khan of Kalat said in his speech: “I thank God that one aspiration, that is independence, has been achieved, but the other two, the enforcement of Shariah-i-Muhammadi and unification of Baluch people, remain to be fulfilled.”27 The speech was delivered in the Baluchi language, with promises to work towards the unfulfilled aspirations. He also expressed the sense of incompleteness of the process of unification and independence, and appeared to be referring to the leased areas, which Pakistan had inherited from British India.
What complicated the situation was the desire of Kharan and Las Bela, two feudatories of Kalat, to accede to Pakistan, irrespective of Kalat’s decision. Moreover, Mekran, which was a district of Kalat, wanted to do the same. There are a plethora of letters from the rulers of Kharan and Las Bela entreating the Quaid to accept the accession of their states to Pakistan, irrespective of Kalat’s decision. Mir Mohammed Habibullah Khan, the ruler of Kharan, wrote to the Quaid on August 21, 1947: “I announce on behalf of myself and my subjects…and joins Pakistan Dominion as its suzerain and promises to serve Pakistan up to its extent.”28 In each successive letter, Habibullah Khan makes it apparent that the supremacy of Kalat is unacceptable to him. He wrote to the Quaid in November 1947, by then the Governor-General of Pakistan: “My State will never submit to the dictates of the Kalat State and will continue to oppose any moves aimed at an interference of the State’s freedom to act.”29 A few days later writing again to the Governor-General, he argued that it is not possible any longer for Kharan to bear the undue interference from the Kalat state, and described the legal status of Kharan in these words: “Following the lapse of the British paramountcy, Kharan repudiated the supremacy of Kalat and acceded to Pakistan.”30 Kharan also complained that Kalat was arming the “mischief mongers” in Kharan with the purpose of creating law and order situation in Pakistan-controlled areas.
By October 1947, Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah had a change of heart on the recognition of Kalat as an “Independent and a Sovereign State”, and wanted the Khan to sign the same form of instrument of accession as the other states which had joined Pakistan.31 The Khan was unwilling to abandon the nominally achieved independent status but ready to concede on defence, foreign affairs and communications. However, he was unwilling to sign either a treaty or an Instrument, until and unless he had got a satisfactory agreement on the leased areas.32 Fears were also being voiced that officials of the Government of Pakistan might start dealing with the two feudatories of Las Bela and Kharan, and accept their de facto accession, as these two feudatories “were recognized by the Crown Representative as separate States” prior to August 15, 1947.33
Mir Mohammad Habibullah Khan, the ruler of Kharan, wrote to the Quaid-i-Azam Mohammed Ali Jinnah in December 1947 and explained why Kharan did not accept the suzerainty of Kalat. He said that before the advent of the British, Kharan was under the influence of Afghanistan, and that it was in 1883 that it accepted the paramountcy of Britain. Kharan, he said, received an allowance of Rs. 6,000 per year from the British until August 15, 1947 in lieu of the allowance it used to get from Afghanistan. He argued that Kharan was an independent state under the paramountcy of the British. Kalat, he said, has always wanted to subjugate Kharan, and even launched an armed attack against Kharan in 1939 to force it to accept Kalat’s hegemony. Habibullah Khan then declared: “After August 15, 1947, Kharan is absolutely an independent State. It has decided to accede to Pakistan. However, whether Kharan joins Pakistan or remains outside, this much is clear that it will never, in any way, accept Kalat’s hegemony.”34 His position about the Brohi Confederacy was that Sardar Azad Khan, the ruler of Kharan, had not recognized the Khan of Kalat as his Sardar during Sir Robert Sandeman’s tenure of office.35
The ruler of Kharan in Baluchistan, while visiting Karachi in October 1947, issued a statement, saying: “Kharan was equal to Kalat and would never suffer subordination to her; Kharan would live and, if necessary, die for Pakistan.” Kalat continued to deny that either of the two feudatories could be regarded as separate states. 36
By February 1948, the discussions between Kalat and the Government of Pakistan were coming to a head. The Quaid wrote to the Khan of Kalat: “I advise you to join Pakistan without further delay…and let me have your final reply which you promised to do after your stay with me in Karachi when we fully discussed the whole question in all its aspects.”37 On February 15, 1948, the Quaid-i-Azam visited Sibi, Baluchistan and addressed a Royal Durbar, where he announced that until the Pakistan Constitution is finally written in about two years time, he would govern the province with the help of an advisory council that he would nominate. However, the main reason for the Quaid’s visit to Baluchistan was to persuade the Khan of Kalat to accede to Pakistan. As it transpired, the Khan failed to turn up for the final meeting with him, pleading illness. In his letter to the Quaid, he said that he had summoned both Houses of the Parliament, Dar-ul-Umara and Dar-ul-Awam, for their opinion about the future relations with the Dominion of Pakistan, and he would inform him about their opinion by the end of the month.38
When the Dar-ul-Awam met on February 21, 1948, it decided not to accede, but to negotiate a treaty to determine Kalat’s future relations with Pakistan.39 According to one report, the Afghan government was also interested in coming to an agreement with the Khan on their own terms. The Khan of Kalat also called a meeting of the Dar-ul-Umara to consider Quaid’s request for Kalat to accede to Pakistan. The Dar-ul-Umara asked the Khan to seek three months to consider this request. An intelligence report on the proceedings of the meetings reported that copies of the Instrument of Accession were distributed at the Dar-ul-Awam and Dar-ul-Umara before the members cast their votes, and that the Kalat State National Party was “propagating that accession meant restriction on their forces and armament, undesired freedom for their women and migration of Muslim refuges into the State which will weaken the voice of the original residents”.40 The Khan of Kalat, the report said, made a brief speech before the Dar-ul-Awam, in which he emphasized the need to have friendly relations with Pakistan, and also said that the intentions of the Quaid towards Kalat were good. The Prime Minister of Kalat spoke next, and said that since this House had voted for Kalat’s independence, he went to see the Quaid in January and had a two-and-a-half hour meeting. He said the Quaid was prepared to help the State in every way, and while independence of the State would remain intact, the only way forward for Kalat was to accede to Pakistan in the matters of Defence, Communications and Foreign Affairs.41 The Prime Minister argued that with accession in respect of the three subjects, the internal independence of Kalat would not be affected. But Mir Ghaus Baksh Bizanjo spoke against accession to Pakistan, and he argued that if Pakistan wanted friendship with Kalat, it should restore its leased territories as well as Kharan and Las Bela. The House dispersed without any intention of meeting again. Dar-ul-Umara asked for three months to study the terms of accession in order to understand its implications.42 The intelligence report also alleged that a day prior to the meeting of the Dar-ul-Awam, on February 25, Agha Abdul Karim, the brother of the Khan of Kalat, met the members of the Kalat State National Party at Dhadar to discuss the issue of the accession of Kalat to Pakistan, and it was here that a resolution was drafted rejecting the accession.43
On March 9, 1948 the Khan received communication from the Quaid announcing that he had decided not to deal personally with the Kalat state negotiations, which would henceforth be dealt with by the Pakistan Government. So far there had not been any formal negotiations but only an informal request made by the Quaid to the Khan at Sibi.
This request was placed before the Council of Sardars of the state, which asked for three months to consider the matter.44 The Khan was, however, under pressure from the Afghan government, which would have liked to negotiate an agreement on their own terms.45.
By early March 1948 it was obvious that Kalat’s accession was in limbo. The Quaid met Habibullah Khan on March 4, and promised him that a decision about Kharan’s relations with Pakistan would be made soon.46 On March 17, 1948 the Pakistan Foreign Ministry sent a telegram to London announcing that Kharan, Las Bela and Mekran had applied for accession to Pakistan and their accession had been accepted.47 The US Ambassador to Pakistan in his dispatch home on March 23, 1948 informed that on March 18, “Kharan, Las Bela and Mekran, feudatory states of Kalat” had acceded to Pakistan. He also wrote that their accession had “reduced the size of Kalat by more than one half, cutting that State off completely from the coast and leaving it largely isolated. As mentioned in the Embassy’s dispatch of March 10, the Rulers of Kharan and Las Bela had for some time been toying with the idea of acceding to Pakistan irrespective of the decision of the Khan of Kalat”.48 The Khan of Kalat objected to their accession, arguing that it was a violation of Kalat’s Standstill Agreement with Pakistan. He also said that while Kharan and Las Bela were its feudatories, Mekran was a district of Kalat. The British Government had placed the control of the foreign policy of the two feudatories under Kalat in July 1947, prior to partition.49
The ruler of Las Bela too had been lobbying with the Quaid-i-Azam to let his state accede to Pakistan. Kharan and Las Bela appear to have been operating in tandem on this issue.50 On September 5, 1947, Mir Ghulam Qadir wrote to the Quaid, saying that he had already written to the Pakistani Prime Minister offering accession of Las Bela to the Pakistan Dominion.51 The letter also mentioned the dire economic conditions of the people of Las Bela as its supplies seem to have been cut off by Kalat. On March 17, 1948, Las Bela too acceded to Pakistan along with Mekran and Kharan. However, by this time the Kalat Government had heard a Radio Pakistan announcement that the Government of Pakistan had accepted the separate accession of Las Bela, Kharan, and Mekran, and wanted this report denied. 52 The Kalat Government said that the accession of these states would be contrary to the Standstill Agreement with Pakistan, which was recently affirmed in the House of Commons.53
On March 18, 1948, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Pakistan issued a press note that the States of Kharan, Las Bela and Mekran had applied for accession to Pakistan, which was granted to them. The press report also said that after the accession of these three states to Pakistan, Kalat’s territory had been reduced to half of its previous area, and had ceased to have any outlet to the sea.54 The UK High Commissioner in Pakistan reported that the offer of accession was accepted by the Pakistan Cabinet when Jam of Las Bela, Chief of Kharan and Nawab Bai Khan of Mekran met the Quaid on March 17, 1948 and told him that “if Pakistan was not prepared to accept their offers of accession immediately, they would be compelled to take other steps for their protection against Khan of Kalat’s aggressive actions.”55 This was seen as a blow to the Khan as head of the Confederacy, the Baluchistan States Union.
What finally forced the Khan of Kalat to accede was the furore caused by news on the All India Radio that the Khan had been negotiating with India. As a consequence of these developments, a report on March 20, claimed that the brother of the Khan, who was also the Governor of Kalat, was leaving for Afghanistan with his wife, who was from the Royal Afghan family.56 However, on March 28, the Reuters news agency carried a story filed from Karachi that ‘“Gateway State” Joins Pakistan’. The Khan issued a communique, which said: “On the night of March 27, All India Radio, Delhi announced that two months ago Kalat State had approached the Indian Union to accept its accession to India and that the Indian Union had rejected the request…It had never been my intention to accede to India . . . It is, therefore, declared that from 9 pm on March 27th – the time when I heard the false news over the air, I forthwith decide to accede to Pakistan, and that whatever differences now exist between Kalat and Pakistan be placed in writing before Mr Jinnah, the Governor-General of Pakistan, whose decision I shall accept.”57 The UK High Commissioner, commenting on the Khan’s denials, wrote: “Khan’s public denials of rumours about offers made to him by India and Afghanistan conflict with his own statements in earlier discussion with Pakistan representatives, when he used these offers as a blackmailing argument. There is good reason to believe that he has been flirting with both India and Afghanistan.” 58
While the Instrument of Accession was signed by the Khan of Kalat on March 27, it was placed before Jinnah on March 31, 1948, who accepted it. There was no kind of resistance to the accession till the middle of July 1948, when the brother of the Khan returned from Afghanistan, where he had fled with a body of armed followers. The Pakistan Army engaged this band and the majority of his followers arrested.59
As this account makes amply clear, the story of the accession of Kalat was a long drawn out process. And although Pakistan came into being on August 14, 1947, the accession of Kalat did not take place till March 27, 1948. The three feudatories, two of which Las Bela and Kharan, which were recognized by the British as independent, played a key role in forcing the Khan of Kalat to accede to Pakistan.
The issue of the accession of Kalat has been clouded in controversy and mythology, because little or no research has been done on the subject. One scholar has described the annexation as, “a nine month tug of war that came to a climax in the forcible annexation of Kalat.”60 The reality is quite different. Khan of Kalat had no choice but to accede after Kharan, Las Bela and Mekran’s acceded to Pakistan, cutting off Kalat from the sea. The announcement on All India Radio that Kalat had been negotiating with India, which Nehru was at pains to deny in the Indian Parliament, caused such an outcry within Baluchistan and outside that the Khan acceded immediately to Pakistan. It was only in July 1948, three months after the accession of Kalat, when the Khan’s brother, Prince Abdul Karim, returned to Kalat with a lashkar and a skirmish took place between the lashkar and a small Pakistan army contingent. Mountbatten’s policy towards the Indian princely states had conclusively turned against giving the princely states the option of independence, and the choice was accession to either of the two Dominions. As the correspondence of the UK High Commissioner to Pakistan shows, the British government was very concerned that Kalat should not be granted independence. Given all the above-mentioned conditions, any chances of Kalat being able to remain independent were just not there.
1. Ainslie T. Embree ed., Pakistan’s Western Borderlands: The Transformation of a Political Order, Durham, North Carolina: Carolina Academic Press, 1977, p. xvii.
2. Ibid. p. xviii.
3. I. Baloch, The Problem of Greater Baluchistan, Stuttgart: Steiner Verlag Wiesbaden GMBH, 1987. p. 168.
4. Ibid. p. 170.
5. Ibid. p. 171.
6. Enclosure 1 to PS-49, Muhamed Aslam to Lancelot Griffin, Jinnah Papers, The States: Historical and Policy Perspectives and Accession to Pakistan, First Series, Volume VIII, Editor-in-Chief, Z. H. Zaidi, Quaid-i-Azam Papers Project, Government of Pakistan. p. 118.
7. Ibid.
8. Ibid. p. 119.
9. Ibid. p. 120.
10. Ibid. p. 122.
11. Ibid. p. 123.
12. Ibid. PS-54, Minutes of Viceroy’s Twentieth Miscellaneous Meeting, R/3/1/166, p. 135.
13. Viceroy’s Miscellaneous Meetings, 20th Meeting Minutes, July 19, L/P&S/13/ 1846, Oriental Section, British Library.
14. Ibid.
15. PS-54, Minutes of Viceroy’s Twentieth Miscellaneous Meeting, R/3/1/166, Jinnah Papers. p. 135.
16. PS-54, Minutes of Viceroy’s Twentieth Miscellaneous Meeting, Jinnah Papers, p. 137.
17. Ibid.
18. L/P&S/13/1846, Viceroy’s Miscellaneous Meetings, 25th Meeting Minutes, August 4, 1947, p. 45.
19. The High Commissioner of UK in Pakistan, Draft Letter, September 22, 1947, L/P&S/13/1846.
20. Ibid.
21. Hodson, p. 361. Also see Andrew Roberts, Eminent Churchillians, p. 103.
22. Annexure to Annex I to PS-66, Memorandum by the Minister of State for Commonwealth Relations, PRO, FO 371/F. 12773, Jinnah Papers. p. 154.
23. Ibid.
24. Letter from the High Commissioner for the UK in Pakistan to the Commonwealth Relations Office, September 24, 1947, L/P&S/13/1846. p. 29.
25. Ibid.
26. Ibid. Political Department, Register No. Pol. 1422/47. p. 24.
27. Speech by the Ruler of Kalat, PS-67, Jinnah Papers, Vol. VIII. p. 156.
28. PS-128, Ruler of Kharan to M.A. Jinnah, Telegram, F.124 (5)-GG/1, Jinnah Papers. p. 223.
29. PS-129, Ruler of Kharan to M. A. Jinnah, 12 November, 1947, F124(5)-GG/5-6, Jinnah Papers. p. 224.
30. Ibid. p. 225.
31. Memorandum, Political Department, in response to a Savingram from Grafftey-Smith of October 17, 1947. Register No. Pol. 1422/47, L/P&S/13/1846.
32. Ibid. High Commissioner for the UK, Savingram, October 17, 1947, p. 25.
33. Ibid.
34. PS-131, Ruler of Kharan to M. A. Jinnah, F.124 (5)-GG/10-3, December 1, 1947, Jinnah Papers, p. 227.
35. Ibid. p. 227.
36. Savingram, From High Commissioner for UK in Pakistan to the Commonwealth Relations Office, October 17, 1947. L/P&S/13/1846.
37. Jinnah to Ruler of Kalat, PS-69, Jinnah Papers, Vol. XVIII. p. 160
38. Daily Telegraph, February 16, 1948, “Baluchistan ‘My Special Care’ says Mr Jinnah”.
39. Appreciation of Events in Pakistan, February 1948, POL: 7067/48, L/P&S/13/1847.
40. PS-82 and Annex to PS-82, Jinnah Papers, pp. 170-171.
41. Ibid. p. 171.
42. Ibid. p. 172.
43. Ibid.
44. Ibid. His Majesty’s Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, Whitehall, London, p. 74.
45. LP&S/13/1847, Appreciation of events in Pakistan, POL: 7067/48, P. 73.
46. PS-132, Ruler of Kharan to M. A. Jinnah, F.124(11)-GG/17-9 (Original in Urdu), Jinnah Papers. p. 227.
47. PS-133, Ministry of Foreign Affairs to Geoffrey Prior, Telegram, F. 20-GG/13, March 17, 1948, Jinnah Papers. p. 228.
48. Annex to PS-133, Paul H. Alling to George Marshall, US National Archives, F85.00/3-2348, March 23, 1948, Jinnah Papers, p. 229.
49. Ibid. p. 230.
50. PS-134 to PS-140 Correspondence between M.A. Jinnah and the ruler of Las Bela, Jinnah Papers, pp. 235-239.
51. PS-141, Ruler of Las Bela to M. A. Jinnah, F.20-GG/5-6, Jinnah Papers, p. 240.
52. POL.1067/48 Copy Telegram, Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, Whitehall, London to Foreign Minister, Kalat. Addressed Sir Zafrullah Khan Lake Success. LP&S/13/1847.
53. Inward Telegram to Commonwealth Relations Office from UK High Commissioner in Pakistan, March 20, 1948.
54. Telegram No. 227, March 8, Kalat, LP&S/13/1847.
55. Inward Telegram to Commonwealth Relations Office, POL. 1068/48, From UK High Commissioner in Pakistan, LP&S/13/1847.
56. British Kalat File, Khan’s Protest to Pakistan, March 21, 1948.
57. Reuters, India and Pakistan Service, Karachi, March 28, LP&S/13/1847.
58. Inward Telegram to Commonwealth Relations Office, from UK High Commissioner in Pakistan, March 27, 1948, POL. 1096/48.
59. Monthly appreciation (Pakistan), July 1948, part of POL.10030/48.
60. Selig Harrison, In Afghanistan’s Shadow: Baluch Nationalism and Soviet Temptations, Washington D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, pp. 24-25.